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Abstract In this paper we consider to use the quantum stabilizer codes as secret sharing schemes for
classical secrets. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for qualified and forbidden sets in terms of
quantum stabilizers. Then we give a Gilbert-Varshamove-type sufficient condition for existence of secret
sharing schemes with given parameters, and by using that sufficient condition, we show that roughly 19%
of participants can be made forbidden independently of the size of classical secret, in particular when
an 𝑛-bit classical secret is shared among 𝑛 participants having 1-qubit share each. We also consider how
much information is obtained by an intermediate set and express that amount of information in terms of
quantum stabilizers. All the results are stated in terms of linear spaces over finite fields associated with
the quantum stabilizers.
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1 Introduction
Secret sharing is a scheme to share a secret among multiple participants so that only qualified sets of
participants can reconstruct the secret, while forbidden sets have no information about the secret [32].
A piece of information received by a participant is called a share. A set of participants that is neither
qualified nor forbidden is said to be intermediate. Both secret and shares are traditionally classical infor-
mation. There exists a close connection between secret sharing and classical error-correcting codes [3,7,
10,11,18,20,28].
An extended abstract [25] of this manuscript appeared in the Proceedings of the Eleventh International Workshop on Coding
and Cryptography (WCC 2019), Saint-Jacut-de-la-Mer, France, March 31–April 5, 2019. Its presentation slides are avail-
able from https://www.slideshare.net/RyutarohMatsumoto. This research is partly supported by JSPS Grant No.
17K06419.
Department of Information and Communication Engineering, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan.
E-mail: ryutaroh.matsumoto@nagoya-u.jp
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Aalborg University, Denmark.
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Quantum secret sharing with classical shares 2
After the importance of quantum information became well-recognized, secret sharing schemes with
quantum shares were proposed [8,14,15,16,33]. A connection between quantum secret sharing and quan-
tum error-correcting codes has been well-known for many years [8,14,33]. Well-known classes of quan-
tum error-correcting codes are the CSS codes [6,34], the stabilizer codes [4,5,13] and their nonbinary
generalizations [2,17,26].
The access structure of a secret sharing scheme is the set of qualified sets, that of intermediate sets and
that of forbidden sets. For practical use of secret sharing, one needs sufficient (and desirably necessary)
conditions on qualified sets and forbidden sets. It is natural to investigate access structures of secret shar-
ing schemes constructed from quantum error-correcting codes. For secret sharing schemes with quantum
secret and quantum shares, necessary and sufficient conditions for qualified sets and forbidden sets were
clarified for the CSS codes [23,33] and the stabilizer codes [22]. For classical secret and quantum shares,
the access structure was clarified in [23, Section 4.1] with [30, Theorem 1] for the CSS codes but has not
been clarified for secret sharing schemes based on quantum stabilizer codes, as far as this author knows.
Advantages of using quantum shares for sharing a classical secret are that we can have smaller size of
shares [14, Section 4], and that we can realize access structures that cannot be realized by classical shares
[21,24]. For example, it is well-known that the size of classical shares cannot be smaller than that of the
classical secret in a perfect secret sharing scheme, where perfect means that there is no intermediate set,
while ramp or non-perfectmeans that there exist intermediate sets [35]. On the other hand, the superdense
coding can be a secret sharing scheme sharing 2 bits by 2 qubits sent to 2 participants [14, Section 4]. Any
participant has no information about the secret, while the 2 participants can reconstruct the secret. We
see a perfect threshold scheme sharing 2-bit classical secret by 1-qubit shares. This paper will generalize
Gottesman’s secret sharing [14, Section 4] to the arbitrary number of participants and the arbitrary size
of classical secrets.
In this paper we give necessary and sufficient conditions for qualified and forbidden sets in terms of
the underlying linear spaces over finite fields of quantum stabilizers in Section 3, after introducing nec-
essary notations in Section 2. Section 3 also includes sufficient conditions in terms of a quantity similar
to relative generalized Hamming weight [19] of classical linear codes related to the quantum stabilizers.
We also consider howmuch information is obtained by an intermediate set and express that amount of in-
formation in terms of the underlying linear spaces of quantum stabilizers in Section 4. Then we translate
our theorems over prime finite fields by the symplectic inner product into arbitrary finite fields, the Eu-
clidean, and the hermitian inner products in Section 5. Section 5 also includes an elementary construction
by the Reed-Solomon codes as an example of Section 5.3. Finally we give a Gilbert-Varshamove-type
sufficient condition for existence of secret sharing schemes with given parameters, and by using that suf-
ficient condition, we show that roughly 19% of participants can be made forbidden independently of the
size of classical secret, which cannot be realized by classical shares, in Section 6. Concluding remarks
are given in Section 7. The extended abstract [25] in the workshop had no mathematical proofs and only
few examples due to space limitation and there were confusing typographical errors in the main theorems
[25, Theorems 18 and 19].
2 Notations
Let 𝑝 be a prime number, 𝐅𝑝 the finite field with 𝑝 elements, and 𝐂𝑝 the 𝑝-dimensional complex linearspace. The quantum state space of 𝑛 qudits is denoted by 𝐂⊗𝑛𝑝 with its orthonormal basis {|𝐯⟩ ∶ 𝐯 ∈ 𝐅𝑛𝑝}.
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For two vectors 𝐚, 𝐛 ∈ 𝐅𝑛𝑝, denote by ⟨𝐚, 𝐛⟩𝐸 the standard Euclidean inner product. For two vectors
(𝐚|𝐛) and (𝐚′|𝐛′) ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 , we define the standard symplectic inner product
⟨(𝐚|𝐛), (𝐚′|𝐛′)⟩𝑠 = ⟨𝐚,𝐛′⟩𝐸 − ⟨𝐚′,𝐛⟩𝐸 .
For an 𝐅𝑝-linear space 𝐶 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 , 𝐶⟂𝑠 denotes its orthogonal space in 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 with respect to ⟨⋅, ⋅⟩𝑠.
Throughout this paper we always assume dim𝐶 = 𝑛 − 𝑘 and 𝐶 ⊆ 𝐶⟂𝑠.
For (𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 , define the 𝑝𝑛 × 𝑝𝑛 complex unitary matrix𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛) as defined in [17]. An [[𝑛, 𝑘]]𝑝quantum stabilizer codes 𝑄 encoding 𝑘 qudits into 𝑛 qudits can be defined as a simultaneous eigenspace
of all 𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛) ((𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝐶). Unlike [17] we do not require the eigenvalue of 𝑄 to be one.
It is well-known in mathematics [1, Chapter 7] that there always exists 𝐶 ⊆ 𝐶max ⊆ 𝐶⟂𝑠 such that
𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max. Note that 𝐶max is not unique and usually there are many possible choices of 𝐶max. We have
dim𝐶max = 𝑛 and have an isomorphism 𝑓 ∶ 𝐅𝑘𝑝 → 𝐶⟂𝑠∕𝐶max as linear spaces without inner products.
Since 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max, 𝐶max defines an [[𝑛, 0]]𝑝 quantum stabilizer code 𝑄0. Without loss of generalitywe may assume 𝑄0 ⊂ 𝑄. Let |𝜑⟩ ∈ 𝑄0 be a quantum state vector. Since 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max, for a coset
𝑉 ∈ 𝐶⟂𝑠∕𝐶max and (𝐚|𝐛), (𝐚′|𝐛′) ∈ 𝑉 ,𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛)|𝜑⟩ and𝑋(𝐚′)𝑍(𝐛′)|𝜑⟩ differ by a constant multiple in
𝐂 and physically express the same quantum state in𝑄. By an abuse of notation, for a coset 𝑉 ∈ 𝐶⟂𝑠∕𝐶maxwe will write |𝑉 𝜑⟩ to mean 𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛)|𝜑⟩ ((𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝑉 ).
For a given classical secret𝐦 ∈ 𝐅𝑘𝑝 , we consider the following secret sharing scheme with 𝑛 partici-pants:
1. 𝑓 (𝐦) is a coset of 𝐶⟂𝑠∕𝐶max. Prepare the quantum codeword |𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑⟩ ∈ 𝑄 that corresponds to theclassical secret 𝐦.
2. Distribute each qudit in the quantum codeword |𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑⟩ to a participant.
We can also consider a secret sharing scheme for a 𝑘-qudit secret |𝐦⟩ with 𝑛 participants as follows:
1. Encode a given quantum secret∑𝐦∈𝐅𝑘𝑝 𝛼(𝐦)|𝐦⟩ into the quantum codeword∑𝐦∈𝐅𝑘𝑝 𝛼(𝐦)|𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑⟩ ∈
𝑄, where 𝛼(𝐦) ∈ 𝐂 are complex coefficients with∑𝐦∈𝐅𝑘𝑝 |𝛼(𝐦)|2 = 1.2. Distribute each qudit in the quantum codeword∑𝐦∈𝐅𝑘𝑝 𝛼(𝐦)|𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑⟩ to a participant.
Let 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛} be a set of shares (or equivalently participants), 𝐴 = {1, . . . , 𝑛} ⧵𝐴, and Tr𝐴 the
partial trace over 𝐴. For a density matrix 𝜌, col(𝜌) denotes its column space. When col(𝜌1), . . . , col(𝜌𝑛)are orthogonal to each other, that is, 𝜌𝑖𝜌𝑗 = 0 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, we can distinguish 𝜌1, . . . , 𝜌𝑛 by a suitableprojective measurement with probability 1.
Definition 1 We say 𝐴 to be 𝑐-qualified (classically qualified) if col(Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑|)) and
col(Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦′)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦′)𝜑|)) are orthogonal to each other for different 𝐦, 𝐦′ ∈ 𝐅𝑘𝑝 . We say 𝐴 to be
𝑐-forbidden (classically forbidden) if Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑|) is the same density matrix regardless ofclassical secret 𝐦. By a classical access structure we mean the set of 𝑐-qualified sets and the set of 𝑐-
forbidden sets.
For a quantum secret, the quantum qualified (𝑞-qualified) sets and the quantum forbidden (𝑞-
forbidden) sets are mathematically defined in [30]. By a quantum access structure we mean the set of
𝑞-qualified sets and the set of 𝑞-forbidden sets.
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Remark 2 When classical shares on 𝐴 is denoted by 𝑆𝐴, the conventional definition of qualifiedness is
𝐼(𝐦;𝑆𝐴) = 𝐻(𝐦) and that of forbiddenness is 𝐼(𝐦;𝑆𝐴) = 0 [35], where𝐻(⋅) denotes the entropy and
𝐼(⋅; ⋅) denotes the mutual information [9]. Let 𝜌𝐴 = ∑𝐦∈𝐅𝑘𝑝 𝑝(𝐦)Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑|), where 𝑝(𝐦) isthe probability distribution of classical secrets 𝐦. The quantum counterpart of mutual information for
classical random variables is the Holevo information 𝐼(𝐦; 𝜌𝐴) [29, Section 12.1.1]. 𝐴 is 𝑐-qualified ifand only if 𝐼(𝐦; 𝜌𝐴) = 𝐻(𝐦), and is 𝑐-forbidden if and only if 𝐼(𝐦; 𝜌𝐴) = 0. Therefore, Definition 1 isa natural generalization of the conventional definition in [35].
Example 3 We will see how one can express the secret sharing scheme based on superdense coding [14,
Section 4] by a quantum stabilizer. Let 𝑝 = 2, 𝑛 = 2 and𝐶 be the zero-dimensional linear space consisting
of only the zero vector. Then𝐶⟂𝑠 = 𝐅42. We choose𝐶max as the space spanned by (1, 1|0, 0) and (0, 0|1, 1).For a classical secret (𝑚1, 𝑚2) ∈ 𝐅22, define the map 𝑓 as 𝑓 (𝑚1, 𝑚2) = (𝑚1, 0|𝑚2, 0) +𝐶max ∈ 𝐶⟂𝑠∕𝐶max.We can choose [[2, 0]]2 quantum code 𝑄0 as the one-dimensional complex linear space spanned by theBell state |𝜑⟩ = |00⟩ + |11⟩√
2
,
which corresponds to the two-bit secret (0, 0). The secret (𝑚1, 𝑚2) is encoded to
𝑋(𝑚1, 0)𝑍(𝑚2, 0)|𝜑⟩ = |𝑚10⟩ + (−1)𝑚2 |(1 − 𝑚1)1⟩√
2
.
It is clear that the share set {1, 2} is 𝑐-qualified. When 𝐴 = {1} or 𝐴 = {2}, we have
Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑|) = 12
(
1 0
0 1
)
,
which means {1}, {2} and ∅ are 𝑐-forbidden. We have determined the classical access structure com-
pletely, and we see that this scheme is perfect [35] in the sense that there is no intermediate set.
For completeness we also note its quantum access structure. The set {1, 2} is 𝑞-qualified and ∅ is
𝑞-forbidden, of course. By [22, Eq. (3)], we see that {1} and {2} are intermediate, that is, neither qual-
ified nor forbidden. This quantum access structure exemplifies the fact that 𝑞-qualifiedness implies 𝑐-
qualifiedness, that 𝑞-forbiddenness implies 𝑐-forbiddenness and that their converses are generally false
[30, Theorems 1 and 2]. It also exemplifies the fact that if quantum secret is larger than quantum shares
then the scheme cannot be perfect [8,14].
3 Necessary and sufficient conditions on classically qualified and classically forbidden sets
Let 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛}. Define 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = {(𝑎1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛|𝑏1, . . . , 𝑏𝑛) ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 ∶ (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖) = 0 for 𝑖 ∉ 𝐴}. Let 𝑃𝐴 to bethe projection map onto 𝐴, that is, 𝑃𝐴(𝑎1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛|𝑏1, . . . , 𝑏𝑛) = (𝑎𝑖|𝑏𝑖)𝑖∈𝐴.
Theorem 4 For the secret sharing scheme described in Section 2, 𝐴 is 𝑐-qualified if and only if
dim𝐶max∕𝐶 = dim𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 . (1)
𝐴 is 𝑐-forbidden if and only if
0 = dim𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 . (2)
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The proof is given after showing two examples below.
Example 5 Consider the situation in Example 3. For 𝐴 = {1} or 𝐴 = {2}, we see that 𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴2 and
𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴2 are the zero linear space and that Eq. (2) holds. For 𝐴 = {1, 2}, Eq. (1) is clearly true.
Example 6 In this example, we show that a different choice of 𝐶max gives a different access structure.Let 𝐶 be as Example 5, and 𝐶max be the linear space generated by (0, 0|1, 0) and (0, 0|0, 1). A classicalsecret (𝑚1, 𝑚2) is now encoded to |𝑚1𝑚2⟩. For 𝐴 = {1} or 𝐴 = {2}, both (1) and (2) are false and both
𝐴 = {1} and 𝐴 = {2} are intermediate sets. This example shows that the choice of 𝐶max is important.
Proof (Theorem 4) Assume Eq. (1). Then there exists a basis {(𝐚1|𝐛1) +𝐶 , . . . , (𝐚𝑘|𝐛𝑘) +𝐶} of 𝐶max∕𝐶such that (𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖) ∈ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 . Since 𝐶⟂𝑠max = 𝐶max, any two vectors in a coset 𝑉 ∈ 𝐶⟂∕𝐶max have the same valueof the symplectic inner product against a fixed (𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), which will be denoted by ⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑉 ⟩𝑠. Supposethat we have two different cosets 𝑉1, 𝑉2 ∈ 𝐶⟂∕𝐶max, and that ⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑉1⟩𝑠 = ⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑉2⟩𝑠 for all 𝑖. Since
𝐶⟂𝑠max = 𝐶max, it means that 𝑉1 − 𝑉2 = 𝐶max is zero in 𝐶⟂∕𝐶max, a contradiction. We have seen that anytwo different cosets have different symplectic inner product values against some (𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖). For each 𝑖, the 𝑛participants can collectively perform quantum projective measurement corresponding to the eigenspaces
of𝑋(𝐚𝑖)𝑍(𝐛𝑖) and can determine the symplectic inner product1 ⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑓 (𝐦)⟩𝑠 as [17, Lemma 5] whenthe classical secret is𝐦. Since (𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖) has nonzero components only at 𝐴, the above measurement can bedone only by 𝐴, which means 𝐴 can reconstruct 𝐦.
Assume that Eq. (1) is false. Since the orthogonal space of 𝐶 in 𝐅𝐴𝑝 is isomorphic to 𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠), whichcan be seen as the almost same argument as the duality between shortened linear codes and punctured
linear codes [31], we see that dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠)∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶max) < dim𝐶⟂𝑠∕𝐶max. This means that there exists twodifferent classical secrets 𝐦1 and 𝐦2 such that 𝑃𝐴(𝑓 (𝐦1)) = 𝑃𝐴(𝑓 (𝐦2)). This means that the encodingprocedures of𝐦1 and𝐦2 are the exactly the same on𝐴 and produce the same density matrix on𝐴, whichshows that 𝐴 is not 𝑐-qualified.
Assume Eq. (2). Then we have dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠)∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶max) = 0. This means that for all classical secrets
𝐦, 𝑃𝐴(𝑓 (𝐦)) and their encoding procedures on 𝐴 are the same, which produces the same density matrixon 𝐴 regardless of 𝐦. This shows that 𝐴 is 𝑐-forbidden.
Assume that Eq. (2) is false. Then there exist two different classical secrets 𝐦1, 𝐦2, and (𝐚|𝐛) ∈
𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ⧵ 𝐶 ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 such that ⟨(𝐚|𝐛), 𝑓 (𝐦1)⟩𝑠 ≠ ⟨(𝐚|𝐛), 𝑓 (𝐦2)⟩𝑠.
By [17, Lemma 5], this means that the quantummeasurement corresponding to𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛) gives different
outcomes with Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦1)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟏)𝜑|) and Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦2)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟐)𝜑|). Since (𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 , measurementof 𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛) can be performed only by participants in 𝐴. These observations show that 𝐴 is not 𝑐-
forbidden. ⊓⊔
Remark 7 A necessary and sufficient condition for 𝐴 being 𝑞-qualified is [22, Eq. (3)]
𝐶⟂𝑠 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = 𝐶max ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 = 𝐶 ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 . (3)
1 If we assume a non-prime finite field 𝐅𝑞 as our base field, then the quantum measurement outcome just determines [17,Lemma 5] Tr𝑞∕𝑝(⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑓 (𝐦)⟩𝑠) in place of ⟨(𝐚𝑖|𝐛𝑖), 𝑓 (𝐦)⟩𝑠, where Tr𝑞∕𝑝 is the trace map from 𝐅𝑞 to its prime subfield
𝐅𝑝. Assuming a non-prime field 𝐅𝑞 significantly complicates the proofs of Theorem 4 and Lemma 11. So we assume a primefinite field until Section 5.
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Since ker(𝑃𝐴) = 𝐅𝐴𝑝 we have dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠)∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶max) = 𝑘. The relation between duals of punctured codes
and shortened codes [31] implies dim𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = 𝑘. Therefor Eq. (3) implies Eq. (1).Similarly, by [14, Corollary 2], necessary and sufficient condition for 𝐴 being 𝑞-forbidden is
𝐶⟂𝑠 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = 𝐶max ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 = 𝐶 ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 . (4)
By a similar argument we see that Eq. (4) implies Eq. (2).
Next we give sufficient conditions in terms of the coset distance [11] or the first relative generalized
Hamming weight [19]. To do so, we have to slightly modify them. For (𝐚|𝐛) = (𝑎1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛|𝑏1, . . . ,
𝑏𝑛) ∈ 𝐅𝑛𝑝, define its symplectic weight swt(𝐚|𝐛) = |{𝑖 ∶ (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖) ≠ (0, 0)}|. For 𝑉2 ⊂ 𝑉1 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 , we definetheir coset distance as 𝑑𝑠(𝑉1, 𝑉2) = min{swt(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ (𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝑉1 ⧵ 𝑉2}.
Theorem 8 If |𝐴| ≤ 𝑑𝑠(𝐶max, 𝐶) − 1 then 𝐴 is 𝑐-forbidden. If |𝐴| ≥ 𝑛 − 𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠, 𝐶max) + 1 then 𝐴 is
𝑐-qualified.
Example 9 Consider the situation in Example 5. We have 𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂, 𝐶max) = 1, which implies that 2 sharesform a 𝑐-qualified set. We also have 𝑑𝑠(𝐶max, 𝐶) = 2, which implies that 1 share forms a 𝑐-forbidden set.
Proof (Theorem 8) If |𝐴| ≤ 𝑑𝑠(𝐶max, 𝐶) − 1 then there is no (𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ⧵ 𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 and Eq. (2)holds.
Assume that |𝐴| ≥ 𝑛−𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠, 𝐶max)+1, or equivalently, |𝐴| ≤ 𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠, 𝐶max)−1.We have𝐶⟂𝑠∩𝐅𝐴𝑝 =
𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 . We also have 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = ker(𝑃𝐴), which means dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠) − dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶max) = dim𝐶⟂𝑠 −
dim𝐶max = 𝑘. Since dim𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 − dim𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠) − dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶max) = 𝑘, we see thatEq. (1) holds with 𝐴. ⊓⊔
Remark 10 By Remark 7 and a similar argument to the last proof, we see that if |𝐴| ≤ 𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠, 𝐶)−1 then
𝐴 is 𝑞-forbidden and that if |𝐴| ≥ 𝑛 − 𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠, 𝐶) + 1 then 𝐴 is 𝑞-qualified. Note that these observationscan also be deduced from quantum erasure decoding and [14, Corollary 2] and are not novel.
4 Amount of information possessed by an intermediate set
Let 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛} with 𝐴 ≠ ∅ and 𝐴 ≠ {1, . . . , 𝑛}. In this section we study the amount of information
possessed by 𝐴.
Lemma 11 For two classical secrets 𝐦1 and 𝐦2, we have
– Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦1)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟏)𝜑|) = Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦2)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟐)𝜑|) if and only if 𝑓 (𝐦1) and 𝑓 (𝐦2) give the same
symplectic inner product for all vectors in 𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 , and
– col(Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦1)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟏)𝜑|)) and col(Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦2)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟐)𝜑|)) are orthogonal to each other if and
only if 𝑓 (𝐦1) and 𝑓 (𝐦2) give different symplectic inner products for some vector (𝐚|𝐛) in 𝐶max ∩𝐅𝐴𝑝 .
Proof Assume that 𝑓 (𝐦1) and 𝑓 (𝐦2) give the same symplectic inner product for all vectors in𝐶max∩𝐅𝐴𝑝 .Then we have {𝑃𝐴(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ (𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝑓 (𝐦1)} = {𝑃𝐴(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ (𝐚|𝐛) ∈ 𝑓 (𝐦2)}, and the encoding procedureon 𝐴 is the same for 𝐦1 and 𝐦2, which shows Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦1)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟏)𝜑|) = Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦2)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟐)𝜑|).
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Assume that 𝑓 (𝐦1) and 𝑓 (𝐦2) give different symplectic inner products for some vector (𝐚|𝐛) in
𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 . Then the quantum measurement corresponding to 𝑋(𝐚)𝑍(𝐛) can be performed only by theparticipants in 𝐴 and by [17, Lemma 5] the outcomes for |𝑓 (𝐦1)𝜑⟩ and |𝑓 (𝐦2)𝜑⟩ are different withprobability 1. This means that col(Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦1)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟏)𝜑|)) and col(Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦2)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟐)𝜑|)) are or-thogonal to each other. ⊓⊔
Proposition 12 If dim𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = 𝓁, then the number of density matrices in 𝛬 =
{Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑|) ∶ 𝐦 ∈ 𝐅𝑘𝑝} is 𝑝𝓁 .
For a fixed density matrix 𝜌 ∈ 𝛬, the number of classical secrets 𝐦 such that 𝜌 =
Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦)𝜑|) is exactly 𝑝𝑘−𝓁 .
Proof If 𝑃𝐴(𝐮1|𝐯1) + 𝑃𝐴(𝐶max) ≠ 𝑃𝐴(𝐮2|𝐯2) + 𝑃𝐴(𝐶max) for (𝐮𝑖|𝐯𝑖) ∈ 𝑓 (𝐦𝑖) with classical secrets
𝐦𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2), then by Lemma 11 col(Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦1)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦𝟏)𝜑|)) and col(Tr𝐴(|𝑓 (𝐦2)𝜑⟩⟨𝑓 (𝐦2)𝜑|)) areorthogonal. By the assumption, we have dim𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 = dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠)∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶max) = 𝓁. There
are 𝑝𝓁 elements in 𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠)∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶max), which shows the first claim.The composite 𝐅𝑝-linear map “mod 𝑃𝐴(𝐶max)” ◦𝑃𝐴◦𝑓 from 𝐅𝑘𝑝 to 𝑃𝐴(𝐶⟂𝑠)∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶max) is surjective.Thus the dimension of its kernel is 𝑘 − 𝓁, which shows the second claim. ⊓⊔
Definition 13 In light of Proposition 12, the amount of information possessed by a set 𝐴 of participants
is defined as
(log2 𝑝) × dim𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑝 . (5)
Remark 14 When the probability distribution of classical secrets 𝐦 is uniform, the quantity in Defini-
tion 13 is equal to the Holveo information [29, Section 12.1.1] counted in log2. To see this, firstly, theset 𝛬 in Proposition 12 consists of non-overlapping projection matrices and each matrix commutes with
every other matrices in 𝛬. So the Holevo information is just equal to the classical mutual information
[9] between random variable 𝑋, corresponding to classical secrets in 𝐅𝑘𝑝 , and random variable 𝑌 , corre-sponding to matrices in 𝛬, where 𝑌 is given as a surjective function of 𝑋. By Proposition 12, 𝑌 has the
uniform probability distribution. Therefore 𝐼(𝑋; 𝑌 ) = 𝐻(𝑌 ) = log2 |𝛬| = Eq. (5).
We say that a secret sharing scheme is 𝑟𝑖-reconstructible if |𝐴| ≥ 𝑟𝑖 implies 𝐴 has 𝑖 log2 𝑝 or morebits of information [12]. We say that a secret sharing scheme is 𝑡𝑖-private if |𝐴| ≤ 𝑡𝑖 implies 𝐴 has lessthan 𝑖 log2 𝑝 bits of information [12]. In order to express 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖 in terms of combinatorial properties of
𝐶 , we introduce a slightly modified version of the relative generalized Hamming weight [19].
Definition 15 For two linear spaces 𝑉2 ⊂ 𝑉1 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑝 and 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑘, define the 𝑖-th relative generalizedsymplectic weight
𝑑𝑖𝑠(𝑉1, 𝑉2) = min{|𝐴| ∶ dim𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∩ 𝑉1 − dim𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∩ 𝑉2 ≥ 𝑖}. (6)
Note that 𝑑1𝑠 = 𝑑𝑠. The following theorem generalizes Theorem 8.
Theorem 16
𝑡𝑖 ≥ 𝑑𝑖𝑠(𝐶max, 𝐶) − 1,
𝑟𝑘+1−𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 − 𝑑𝑖𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠, 𝐶max) + 1.
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Example 17 Consider the situation of Example 9. We have 𝑑1𝑠 (𝐶max, 𝐶) = 𝑑2𝑠 (𝐶max, 𝐶) = 2, and
𝑑1𝑠 (𝐶
⟂𝑠, 𝐶max) = 𝑑2𝑠 (𝐶
⟂𝑠, 𝐶max) = 1. Unlike the relative generalized Hamming weight, we do not havethe strict monotonicity in 𝑖 of 𝑑𝑖𝑠.
Proof (Theorem 16) Assume that |𝐴| ≤ 𝑡𝑖. By definition of 𝑑𝑖𝑠, dim𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ≤ 𝑖 − 1, whichshows the first claim.
Assume that |𝐴| ≥ 𝑟𝑖. Then |𝐴| ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠, 𝐶max)−1, which implies dim𝐶⟂𝑠∩𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶max∩𝐅𝐴𝑝 ≤ 𝑖−1.
The last inequality implies dim𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ≥ 𝑘 − 𝑖 + 1. which shows the second claim. ⊓⊔
5 Translations to arbitrary finite fields and to the ordinary Hamming weight
5.1 Translation to arbitrary finite fields
Let 𝑞 = 𝑝𝜇 with 𝜇 ≥ 1, and {𝛾1, . . . , 𝛾𝜇} be a fixed 𝐅𝑝-basis of 𝐅𝑞 . Ashikhmin and Knill [2] proposed thefollowing translation from 𝐅𝑞 to 𝐅𝑝 for quantum stabilizer codes. Let𝑀 be a 𝜇×𝜇 invertible matrix over
𝐅𝑝 whose (𝑖, 𝑗) element is Tr𝑞∕𝑝(𝛾𝑖𝛾𝑗), where Tr𝑞∕𝑝 is the trace map from 𝐅𝑞 to 𝐅𝑝. Let 𝜙 be an 𝐅𝑝-linear
isomorphism sending (𝑎1,1, . . . , 𝑎1,𝜇, 𝑎2,1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛,𝜇|𝑏1,1, . . . , 𝑏1,𝜇, 𝑏2,1, . . . , 𝑏𝑛,𝜇) ∈ 𝐅2𝜇𝑛𝑝 to( 𝜇∑
𝑗=1
𝑎1,𝑗𝛾𝑗 ,… ,
𝜇∑
𝑗=1
𝑎𝑛,𝑗𝛾𝑗
||||||
𝜇∑
𝑗=1
𝑏′1,𝑗𝛾𝑗 ,… ,
𝜇∑
𝑗=1
𝑏′𝑛,𝑗𝛾𝑗
)
∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 ,
where (𝑏′𝑖,1, . . . , 𝑏′𝑖,𝜇) = (𝑏𝑖,1, . . . , 𝑏𝑖,𝜇)𝑀−1 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛.Ashikhmin and Kinill proved the following.
Proposition 18 [2] Let 𝐶 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 . Then dim𝐅𝑝 𝜙−1(𝐶) = 𝜇 dim𝐅𝑞 𝐶 , and 𝜙−1(𝐶)⟂𝑠 = 𝜙−1(𝐶⟂𝑠), where
dim𝐅𝑞 is the dimension of a linear space considered over 𝐅𝑞 .
Let 𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max ⊂ 𝐶⟂𝑠 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 with dim𝐅𝑞 𝐶 = 𝑛 − 𝑘. Then we have 𝜙−1(𝐶) ⊂ 𝜙−1(𝐶max) =
𝜙−1(𝐶max)⟂𝑠 ⊂ 𝜙−1(𝐶)⟂𝑠 ⊂ 𝐅
2𝜇𝑛
𝑝 andwe can construct a secret sharing scheme by𝜙−1(𝐶) ⊂ 𝜙−1(𝐶max). Itencodes 𝑘𝜇 log2 𝑝 = 𝑘 log2 𝑞 bits of classical secrets𝐦 ∈ 𝐅𝑘𝑞 into 𝜇𝑛 qudits in𝐂𝑝, which can also be seenas 𝑛 qudits in 𝐂𝑞 , where 𝐂𝑞 is the 𝑞-dimensional complex linear space. Let 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛}. By abuse of
notation, by 𝐅𝐴𝑝 wemean {(𝑎1,1, . . . , 𝑎1,𝜇, 𝑎2,1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛,𝜇|𝑏1,1, . . . , 𝑏1,𝜇, 𝑏2,1, . . . , 𝑏𝑛,𝜇) ∈ 𝐅2𝜇𝑛𝑝 ∶ 𝑎𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑏𝑖,𝑗 = 0for 𝑖 ∉ 𝐴 and 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝜇}.
We consider each qudit in 𝐂𝑞 of the quantum codeword as a share, and examine the property of ashare set 𝐴. We have
dim𝐅𝑞 𝐶max ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑞 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑞 = 𝜇 dim𝐅𝑝 𝜙
−1(𝐶max) ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 ∕𝜙
−1(𝐶) ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑝 . (7)
Equation (7) together with Theorem 4 imply
– 𝐴 is qualified if and only if dim𝐅𝑞 𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞 = dim𝐅𝑞 𝐶max∕𝐶 , and
– 𝐴 is forbidden if and only if dim𝐅𝑞 𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞 = 0.
The above observation shows that Theorems 4 and 8 also hold for 𝐅𝑞 . In addition, Eq. (7) means that ashare set 𝐴 has (log2 𝑞 × dim𝐅𝑞 𝐶max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞 ∕𝐶 ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞 )-bits of information about the secret 𝐦 ∈ 𝐅𝑘𝑞 , alsogeneralizes the proof argument of Theorem 16, and implies that Theorem 16 also holds for 𝐅𝑞 . In thesequel we consider a qudit in 𝐂𝑞 as each share, and dim means the dimension over 𝐅𝑞 .
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5.2 Translation to the Hamming distance and the hermitian inner product
Many of results in the symplectic construction of quantum error-correcting codes over 𝐅𝑞 are translatedto 𝐅𝑞2 -linear codes with the hermitian inner product [2,17,26]. For 𝐱 ∈ 𝐅𝑛𝑞2 define 𝐱𝑞 as the component-wise 𝑞-th power of 𝐱. For two vectors 𝐱, 𝐲 ∈ 𝐅𝑞2 , define the hermitian inner product as ⟨𝐱, 𝐲⟩ℎ = ⟨𝐱𝑞 ,
𝐲⟩𝐸 . For 𝐷 ⊂ 𝐅𝑛𝑞2 , 𝐷⟂ℎ denotes the orthogonal space of 𝐷 with respect to the hermitian inner product.
Only in Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, for 𝐴 ⊂ {1,. . . , 𝑛}, define 𝐅𝐴𝑞 = {(𝑎1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛) ∈ 𝐅𝑛𝑞 ∶ 𝑎𝑖 = 0 for
𝑖 ∉ 𝐴}, and define 𝑃𝐴 to be the projection map onto 𝐴, that is, 𝑃𝐴(𝑎1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛) = (𝑎𝑖)𝑖∈𝐴.
Theorem 19 Let 𝐷 ⊂ 𝐅𝑛𝑞2 be an 𝐅𝑞2 -linear space. We assume dim𝐷 = 𝑘′ and there exists 𝐷max such
that 𝐷 ⊂ 𝐷max ⊂ 𝐷⟂ℎ and 𝐷max = 𝐷⟂ℎmax, which implies dim𝐷max = 𝑛∕2. Then 𝐷 defines a secret
sharing scheme based on the quantum stabilizer defined by 𝐷 encoding 𝑛 − 2𝑘′ symbols in 𝐅𝑞 . A set
𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛} is 𝑐-qualified if and only if dim𝐷max∕𝐷 = dim𝐷max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞2∕𝐷 ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑞2 . A set 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . ,
𝑛} is 𝑐-forbidden if and only if 0 = dim𝐷max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞2∕𝐷 ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑞2 . If |𝐴| ≥ 𝑛 − 𝑑𝐻 (𝐷⟂ℎ, 𝐷max) + 1 then 𝐴 is
𝑐-qualified, and if |𝐴| ≤ 𝑑𝐻 (𝐷max, 𝐷) − 1 then 𝐴 is 𝑐-forbidden, where 𝑑𝐻 is the coset distance [11], or
equivalently, the first relative generalized Hamming weight [19].
Proof The proof is alomost the same as [17]. ⊓⊔
Example 20 Consider the situation in Example 9. Then 𝐷 = {0} and 𝐷max is the one-dimensional 𝐅4-linear space spanned by (1, 1).
5.3 Translation to the Hamming distance and the Euclidean inner product
Let 𝐶2 ⊂ 𝐶1 ⊂ 𝐅𝑛𝑞 . A method to construct symplectic-self-orthogonal 𝐶 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 is to use {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚 ∈ 𝐶2,
𝐛 ∈ 𝐶⟂𝐸1 } as 𝐶 [5,17], where “⟂ 𝐸” denotes the Euclidean dual. We have 𝐶⟂𝑠 = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚 ∈ 𝐶1,
𝐛 ∈ 𝐶⟂𝐸2 }.
Example 21 Example 6 can also be described by 𝐶2 = {0}, 𝐶1 = 𝐅22, and 𝐶 ′max = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚 ∈ 𝐶2,
𝐛 ∈ 𝐶⟂𝐸2 }.
Remark 22 A suitable choice of 𝐶max is unclear as of this writing. A valid choice is 𝐶 ′max = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶
𝐚 ∈ 𝐶2, 𝐛 ∈ 𝐶⟂𝐸2 }, which gives the standard encoding [6,34] of the CSS codes. But this choice gives noadvantage over the purely classical secret sharing constructed from linear codes 𝐶2 ⊂ 𝐶1 [3,7,18,20].Because the necessary and sufficient condition for 𝑐-qualified 𝐴 is dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶1)∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶2) = dim𝐶1∕𝐶2and the necessary and sufficient condition for 𝑐-forbidden 𝐴 is dim𝑃𝐴(𝐶1)∕𝑃𝐴(𝐶2) = 0 by combining[23, Section 4.1] and [30, Theorem 1], which are exactly the same [12] as those of the purely classical
secret sharing constructed from 𝐶2 ⊂ 𝐶1.
Theorem 23 Let 𝐸 ⊂ 𝐅𝑛𝑞 be the 𝐅𝑞-linear space. We assume dim𝐸 = 𝑘′ and there exists 𝐸max such that
𝐸 ⊂ 𝐸max ⊂ 𝐸⟂𝐸 and 𝐸max = 𝐸⟂𝐸max, which implies dim𝐸max = 𝑛∕2. Then 𝐸 defines a secret sharing
scheme based on the quantum stabilizer defined by 𝐸 encoding 𝑛− 2𝑘′ symbols in 𝐅𝑞 . A set 𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . ,
𝑛} is 𝑐-qualified if and only if dim𝐸max∕𝐸 = dim𝐸max∩𝐅𝐴𝑞 ∕𝐸 ∩𝐅
𝐴
𝑞 . A set𝐴 ⊂ {1, . . . , 𝑛} is 𝑐-forbidden
if and only if 0 = dim𝐸max ∩ 𝐅𝐴𝑞 ∕𝐸 ∩ 𝐅
𝐴
𝑞 . If |𝐴| ≥ 𝑛 − 𝑑𝐻 (𝐸⟂𝐸 , 𝐸max) + 1 then 𝐴 is 𝑐-qualified, and if|𝐴| ≤ 𝑑𝐻 (𝐸max, 𝐸) − 1 then 𝐴 is 𝑐-forbidden.
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Proof The proof is almost the same as [17]. ⊓⊔
Example 24 Example 3 is restored by choosing 𝐸 = {0}, 𝐸⟂𝐸 = 𝐅22, and 𝐸max as the 𝐅2-linear spacespanned by (1, 1). Thus we see that Theorem 23, in contrast to Remark 22, can provide a secret sharing
scheme with an advantage over purely classical secret sharing.
5.4 Construction by the Reed-Solomon codes
Also as an example of Theorem 23, an elementary construction by the Reed-Solomon (RS) codes will be
shown below. In Section 5.4 assume that 𝑛 = 𝑞 and 𝑘 are positive even integers. Fix 𝑛 distinct elements
𝛼1, . . . , 𝛼𝑛 ∈ 𝐅𝑞 . Define
RS(𝑛, 𝑘) = {(𝑔(𝛼1),… , 𝑔(𝛼𝑛)) ∶ 𝑔(𝑥) ∈ 𝐅𝑞[𝑥], deg 𝑔(𝑥) < 𝑘}.
Then RS(𝑛, 𝑘)⟂𝐸 = RS(𝑛, 𝑛 − 𝑘) as 𝑛 = 𝑞.
For a linear space 𝑉 ⊂ 𝐅𝑛𝑞 , its 𝑗-th generalized Hamming weight 𝑑𝑗𝐻 (𝑉 ) is defined by [31]
𝑑𝑗𝐻 (𝑉 ) = min{|𝐴| ∶ dim𝐅𝐴𝑞 ∩ 𝑉 ≥ 𝑗}.
For RS codes, 𝑑𝑗𝐻 (RS(𝑛, 𝑘)) = 𝑛 − 𝑘 + 𝑗 [31].Define
𝐶 = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, (𝑛 − 𝑘)∕2)} ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 ,
𝐶max = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, 𝑛∕2)} ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 ,
which correspond to 𝐸 = RS(𝑛, (𝑛 − 𝑘)∕2) and 𝐸max = RS(𝑛, 𝑛∕2) in Theorem 23. Then we have
𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max,
𝐶⟂𝑠 = {(𝐚|𝐛) ∶ 𝐚,𝐛 ∈ RS(𝑛, (𝑛 + 𝑘)∕2)},
dim𝐶 = 𝑛 − 𝑘,
𝑑𝑗𝑠 (𝐶max, 𝐶) ≥ 𝑑𝑗𝑠 (𝐶max, {𝟎}) ≥ 𝑑⌈𝑗∕2⌉𝐻 (RS(𝑛, 𝑛∕2)) =
⌈
𝑛 + 𝑗
2
⌉
, (8)
𝑑𝑗𝑠 (𝐶
⟂𝑠, 𝐶max) ≥ 𝑑𝑗𝑠 (𝐶⟂𝑠, {𝟎}) ≥ 𝑑⌈𝑗∕2⌉𝐻 (RS(𝑛, (𝑛 + 𝑘)∕2)) =
⌈
𝑛 − 𝑘 + 𝑗
2
⌉
. (9)
In particular we have 𝑑𝑠(𝐶max, 𝐶) ≥ 𝑛∕2 + 1 and 𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠, 𝐶max) ≥ (𝑛− 𝑘)∕2 + 1. For a set of participants
𝐴 ⊆ {1, . . . , 𝑛}, 𝐴 is forbidden if |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛∕2 and 𝐴 is qualified if |𝐴| ≥ (𝑛 + 𝑘)∕2, by Theorem 8 or also
by Theorem 23.
By Theorem 16, 𝑡𝑖 ≥ ⌈(𝑛+𝑖)∕2⌉−1 and 𝑟𝑖 ≤ ⌈(𝑛+𝑖)∕2⌉. In addition, by the definitions of 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖, wehave 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑡𝑖+1. So we see that 𝑡𝑖 = ⌈(𝑛+𝑖)∕2⌉−1 and 𝑟𝑖 = ⌈(𝑛+𝑖)∕2⌉, which also imply that inequalities(8) and (9) are in fact equalities by Theorem 16. Let 𝜌𝐴 be the density matrix of quantum shares in a shareset𝐴 ⊆ {1, . . . , 𝑛}. Until the end of Section 5.4 assume that classical secrets𝐦 are uniformly distributed.
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From Remark 14 and those exact values of 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑘, we see that the Holevo information[29, Section 12.1.1] (quantum counterpart of the mutual information [9]) between 𝐦 and 𝜌𝐴 is
𝐼(𝐦; 𝜌𝐴) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛
2
,
2
(|𝐴| − 𝑛
2
)
log2 𝑞 if 𝑛2 ≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛+𝑘2 ,
𝑘 log2 𝑞 if 𝑛+𝑘2 ≤ |𝐴| ≤ 𝑛.
Observe here that one increment of the share size increases the Holevo information by two 𝐅𝑞 sym-bols. This is in sharp contrast with the classical linear secret sharing [3,7,18,20], because one increment
of the share size can increase the mutual information by at most one 𝐅𝑞 symbol in classical linear se-cret sharing, when each share is one 𝐅𝑞 symbol. Observe also that we have completely determined theclassical access structure of this quantum secret sharing scheme.
6 Gilbert-Varshamov-type existential condition
In this section, we give a sufficient condition for existence of 𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max ⊂ 𝐶⟂𝑠 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 , with givenparameters.
Theorem 25 If positive integers 𝑛, 𝑘, 𝛿𝑡, 𝛿𝑟 satisfy
𝑞𝑛+𝑘 − 𝑞𝑛
𝑞2𝑛 − 1
𝛿𝑟−1∑
𝑖=1
(
𝑛
𝑖
)
(𝑞2 − 1)𝑖 + 𝑞
𝑛 − 𝑞𝑛−𝑘
𝑞2𝑛 − 1
𝛿𝑡−1∑
𝑖=1
(
𝑛
𝑖
)
(𝑞2 − 1)𝑖 < 1, (10)
then there exist 𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶max = 𝐶⟂𝑠max ⊂ 𝐶
⟂𝑠 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 such that dim𝐶 = 𝑛 − 𝑘, 𝑑𝑠(𝐶
⟂𝑠, 𝐶max) ≥ 𝛿𝑟 and
𝑑𝑠(𝐶max, 𝐶) ≥ 𝛿𝑡.
Proof The following argument is similar to the proof of Gilbert-Varshamov bound for stabilizer codes
[4]. Let Sp(𝑞, 𝑛) be the set of invertible matrices on 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 that does not change the values of the symplecticinner product. Let 𝐴(𝑘) be the set of pairs of linear spaces (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) such that dim𝑉 = 𝑛 − 𝑘 and 𝑉 ⊂
𝑊 = 𝑊 ⟂𝑠 ⊂ 𝑉 ⟂𝑠 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 . For 𝐞 ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 , define 𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞) = {(𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘) ∶ 𝐞 ∈ 𝑉 ⟂𝑠 ⧵ 𝑊 } and
𝐵𝑊 (𝑘, 𝐞) = {(𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘) ∶ 𝐞 ∈ 𝑊 ⧵ 𝑉 }. It is known in mathematics [1, Chapter 7]
– for nonzero 𝐞1, 𝐞2 ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 , there exists𝑀 ∈ Sp(𝑞, 𝑛) such that𝑀𝐞1 = 𝐞2, and
– for (𝑉1,𝑊1), (𝑉2,𝑊2) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘), there exists𝑀 ∈ Sp(𝑞, 𝑛) such that𝑀𝑉1 = 𝑉2 and𝑀𝑊1 = 𝑊2.
For nonzero 𝐞1 , 𝐞2 ∈ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 with𝑀1𝐞1 = 𝐞2 (𝑀1 ∈ Sp(𝑞, 𝑛)) and some fixed (𝑉1,𝑊1) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘), we have|𝐵𝑊 (𝑘, 𝐞1)|
= |{(𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘) ∶ 𝐞1 ∈ 𝑊 ⧵ 𝑉 }|
= |{(𝑀𝑉1,𝑀𝑊1) ∶ 𝐞1 ∈𝑀𝑊 ⧵𝑀𝑉 ,𝑀 ∈ Sp(𝑞, 𝑛)}|
= |{(𝑀−11 𝑀𝑉1,𝑀−11 𝑀𝑊1) ∶ 𝐞1 ∈𝑀−11 𝑀𝑊 ⧵𝑀−11 𝑀𝑉 ,𝑀 ∈ Sp(𝑞, 𝑛)}|
= |{(𝑀𝑉1,𝑀𝑊1) ∶𝑀1𝐞1 ∈𝑀𝑊 ⧵𝑀𝑉 ,𝑀 ∈ Sp(𝑞, 𝑛)}|
= |{(𝑀𝑉1,𝑀𝑊1) ∶ 𝐞2 ∈𝑀𝑊 ⧵𝑀𝑉 ,𝑀 ∈ Sp(𝑞, 𝑛)}|
= |{(𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘) ∶ 𝐞2 ∈ 𝑊 ⧵ 𝑉 }|
= |𝐵𝑊 (𝑘, 𝐞2)|.
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By a similar argument we also see |𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞1)| = |𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞2)|.
For each (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘), the number of 𝐞 such that 𝐞 ∈ 𝑊 ⧵ 𝑉 is |𝑊 | − |𝑉 | = 𝑞𝑛 − 𝑞𝑛−𝑘. The
number of triples (𝐞, 𝑉 ,𝑊 ) such that 𝟎 ≠ 𝐞 ∈ 𝑊 ⧵ 𝑉 is∑
𝟎≠𝐞∈𝐅2𝑛𝑞
|𝐵𝑊 (𝑘, 𝐞)| = |𝐴(𝑘)| × (𝑞𝑛 − 𝑞𝑛−𝑘),
which implies |𝐵𝑊 (𝑘, 𝐞)||𝐴(𝑘)| = 𝑞𝑛 − 𝑞𝑛−𝑘𝑞2𝑛 − 1 . (11)
Similarly we have |𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞)||𝐴(𝑘)| = 𝑞𝑛+𝑘 − 𝑞𝑛𝑞2𝑛 − 1 . (12)
If there exists (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∈ 𝐴(𝑘) such that (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∉ 𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞1) and (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) ∉ 𝐵𝑉 (𝑘, 𝐞2) for all 1 ≤
swt(𝐞1) ≤ 𝛿𝑟 − 1 and 1 ≤ swt(𝐞2) ≤ 𝛿𝑡 − 1 then there exists a pair of (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) with the desired properties.The number of 𝐞 such that 1 ≤ swt(𝐞) ≤ 𝛿 − 1 is given by
𝛿−1∑
𝑖=1
(
𝑛
𝑖
)
(𝑞2 − 1)𝑖. (13)
By combining Eqs. (11), (12) and (13) we see that Eq. (10) is a sufficient condition for ensuring the
existence of (𝑉 ,𝑊 ) required in Theorem 25. ⊓⊔
We will derive an asymptotic form of Theorem 25.
Theorem 26 Let 𝑅, 𝜖𝑡 and 𝜖𝑟 be nonnegative real numbers ≤ 1. Define ℎ𝑞(𝑥) = −𝑥 log𝑞 𝑥 − (1 −
𝑥) log𝑞(1 − 𝑥). For sufficiently large 𝑛, if
ℎ𝑞(𝜖𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡 log𝑞(𝑞2 − 1) < 1 and
ℎ𝑞(𝜖𝑟) + 𝜖𝑟 log𝑞(𝑞2 − 1) < 1 − 𝑅,
then there exist 𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶max ⊂ 𝐶⟂𝑠 ⊂ 𝐅2𝑛𝑞 such that dim𝐶 = 𝑛 − ⌊𝑛𝑅⌋, 𝑑𝑠(𝐶⟂𝑠, 𝐶max) ≥ ⌊𝑛𝜖𝑟⌋ and
𝑑𝑠(𝐶max, 𝐶) ≥ ⌊𝑛𝜖𝑡⌋.
Proof Proof can be done by almost the same argument as [27, Section III.C]. ⊓⊔
Theorem 26 has a striking implication that we can construct a secret sharing scheme with roughly
19% of participants being forbidden independently of the size (i.e. 𝑅 in Theorem 26) of classical secrets
for 𝑞 = 2 and large 𝑛, as ℎ2(0.19) + 0.19 log2 3 ≃ 1. Such properties cannot be realized by classicalshares.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered construction of secret sharing schemes for classical secrets by quantum
stabilizer codes, and clarified their access structures, that is, qualified and forbidden sets, in terms of
underlying quantum stabilizers. We expressed our findings in terms of linear spaces over finite fields
associated with the quantum stabilizers, and gave sufficient conditions for qualified and forbidden sets
in terms of combinatorial parameters of the linear spaces over finite fields. It allowed us to use classical
coding theoretic techniques, such as the Gilbert-Varshamov-type argument, and we obtained a sufficient
condition for existence of a secret sharing scheme with given parameters. By using that sufficient condi-
tion, we demonstrated that there exist infinitely many quantum stabilizers with which associated access
structures cannot be realized by any purely classical information processing. We have not thoroughly
considered code construction, which is a future research agenda.
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